Australian Compulsory Arbitration System by O\u27Connell, Daniel
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 5 Symposium Article 7
9-1-1960
Australian Compulsory Arbitration System
Daniel O'Connell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel O'Connell, Australian Compulsory Arbitration System, 35 Notre Dame L. Rev. 640 (1960).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol35/iss5/7
THE AUSTRALIAN COMPULSORY ARBITRATION SYSTEM
by Daniel O'Connell*
The legislation of the United Kingdom on trade union activities is not
directly germane to a discussion on the Australian system of settling industrial
disputes, but some introductory observations on it will serve to put the system
in focus. I am sure that I do not need to remind the audience of the Combina-
tion Acts of 1799, 1800 and 1825. These inhibited the development of trade
unionism in England, but even while they operated many of the practices that
are now familiar to us in industrial relations developed. Among them was col-
lective bargaining and the growth of employers' associations. So long as em-
ployers could keep unionism out of their factories they could avoid negotiation,
but after the middle of the nineteenth century this proved impossible. The year
1875 is the turning point, for then the Employers' and Workmen's Act and
other legislation freed trade unions from criminal liability for strike action and
gave protection to union property. The Trade Disputes Act, 1906, released
unions also from civil responsibility arising out of strikes.
These series of statutes had the effect both of stimulating collective bar-
gaining and of compelling compromise by the threat of strike. By 1948 60 per
cent of workers in England were covered by collective agreements, including
those of the most important industries, coal, iron, steel, engineering and ship-
building, construction, cotton and railways. Collateral with this development
has been a growth of national unionism making possible national agreements,
and hence a common rule throughout an industry.
By Australian standards the English machinery for settlement of industrial
disputes is rudimentary.' In 1896 the Conciliation Act gave the Board of Trade
authority to enquire into the causes of existing and impending strikes; to take
the measures for the parties to meet under an impartial chairman; and to ap-
point a conciliator or an arbitrator on the application of both parties. The
voluntary character of arbitral settlement is fundamental. In 1919 the In-
dustrial Court Act was passed; under this legislation, any dispute could be
referred by either party to the minister of labour, who could appoint a conciliator
without power to decide, or arrange for negotiation, or, with the consent of
both parties, refer the dispute to an industrial court, a single arbitrator or a
special arbitration board.
In one respect this arbitral procedure is not novel. The first Arbitration
Act was passed in 1824, and it was expanded in the Arbitration (Master's and
Workman's) Act, 1877. These made it possible to enforce an award in court,
but neither provided for settlement of disputes over future wages and conditions
nor required the parties to proceed to arbitration. The real change in the later
acts was one of emphasis, the process of mediation being withdrawn from the
B.A., LL.M., Ph.D. (Cantab.); Reader in Law, University of Adelaide.
1 See generally PORTUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION LAW
(1958); FOENANDER, TowARDs INDUSTRIAL PEACE IN AUSTRALIA (1937).
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private intQ the pfiblic domain, and to this eAtent engaging -public sentiment
in settling of disputes.
In essence, however, English law leaves the conditions of work to the parties
themselves. It -is still not clear to what extent a collective agreement, a com-
mon law contract, for example, is enforceable. In fact,, during World War II,
legislation was enacted rendering certain agreements. judicially enforceable,
apparently on the assumption that in its absence they would not be enforce-
able. In New Zealand it was held in Beattie and Coster Co., Ltd. v. Duncan'
that a union acts as an agent for its present members and may consent on.their
behalf. This leaves the position of subsequent members unsatisfactory.
Growth of the Australian System
Apart from the Combination Acts none of the English statutes just men-
tioned applied to Australia. Employment was regulated by colonial Master and
Servant Acts, which until around 1870 permitted imprisonment for breach of
contract by the servant. At this point it is necessary to recall that Australia
is a federation of six former colonies, each of which has had responsible gov-
ernment since the middle of the 19th century. Divergent legislation produced
divergent industrial law. At the present time, except in Victoria, there is power
to fine, and in some cases to imprison, strikers. The South Australian Act is
as old as 1878, and the Western Australian one of 1892 is virtually a copy of
an English Act of 1867. The survival of these penal provisions may appear
anachronistic in a culture which has an egalitarian basis and a militant work-
ing class tradition, yet this survival seems more than ever likely now that
technological development and a large migration of unskilled labour from the
continent has turned the traditional Australian worker into a middle class
minor capitalist, and taken the sting out of the class war. Security, and this
includes security against the effects of other people's industrial controversies,
is now a greater value than working class solidarity.
Generally speaking, Australian industrial law developed more or less along
English lines until 1904. The event which brought a fundamental change was
the great strike of 1890, which was not concerned so much with conditions of
labour as with compulsory unionism and the right of employers to employ
non-union labour in preference to union. It had the effect on the employing
class of demonstrating the economic results of mass working class action; its
failure demonstrated to the unions, who bankrupted themselves in the process
of fighting the employers, that there was little to be gained by violence. Both
sides were thus disposed to search for a permanent method of settling differences
without industrial strife. Before a Royal Commission set up in New South
Wales to report on the causes of the strike it was advocated that a system of
compulsory arbitration be devised. New South Wales took no action but South
Australia did, in 1894 enacting that, if half of each group party to a labour
dispute desired conciliation, a board of conciliation would be set up. It lacked,
however, decisive power of action.
In the same year, 1894, New Zealand passed the first compulsory arbi-
2 New Zealand L. Rep. 1220 (1922).
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tration act during a wave of social legislation that followed the advent to office
of the first Liberal-Labour Party in the Empire. Either party could refer a
dispute to a standing Court of Arbitration but had power to make awards
binding on registered unions. Non-registered unions were not compellable, but
they tended for a variety of reasons to disappear. This act was adopted by
Western Australia in 1900 and by New South Wales in 1901. The Australian
system, however, made three modifications on the New Zealand:
1. Under the New Zealand system conciliation must precede arbitration.
It was found in practice that conciliation was not adequate and that two-
thirds of the disputes went on to arbitration. The Australian acts amalgamated
the processes.
2. The registrar of the court was given power to compel arbitration even
when both parties did not desire it.
3. The New Zealand system made the award operative only between the
parties to the dispute. This meant that, if a dispute involved tailoring, every
tailor would have to be sewed with a log of claims to ensure uniformity of
wages and conditions in the industry. The Australian legislation made it possible
for the court to declare practice or award to be a "common rule" throughout
the industry affected by a dispute. This was in response to union pressure and
was a condition of union support for the system.
At the same time compulsory arbitration was coming to be accepted, ma-
chinery was also being devised to ensure social justice for workers without
the necessity of their enacting disputes. Hence, as a parallel development, wage
boards appeared at the same time as industrial courts, with power to fix a mini-
mum wage. A worker paid less than the minimum wage could sue to recover
the difference. The wages boards were elected by both workers and employers
with independent chairmen. There was an inevitable tendency for the wage
fixing and arbitral functions to vest in the one body; this was first done in
New South Wales in 1908 when the industrial court was empowered to hear
appeals from wages boards. The competence to fix wages is not independent
upon an antecedent dispute, and hence there is no stimulus to artificial dis-
putes.
The Commonwealth System
In 1900 the six colonies federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia.
The great strike of 1890, which tied up several industries, had not been con-
fined to one colony but had extended throughout the continent. It was obvious
that the unions would federate and proceed to uniform action throughout the
states, but it was still an 'enlightened action to include in the Commonwealth
Constitution power to legislate federally to produce a uniform solution to a
nationwide dispute. The element clause in the Constitution prescribes that Par-
liament might legislate with respect to "conciliation and arbitration for the pre-
vention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of
any one State."
The framing of the clause has had an inhibiting effect on the process of
industrial social justice. In the first place, settlement is limited to cases of "in-
dustrial disputes." What is industry? What is a dispute? A dispute between
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school teachers and the government, for example, is not an. "industrial dis-
pute," and the Commonwealth has no jurisdiction over it. In the second place
the dispute must extend over more than one state before there is Common-
wealth jurisdiction. This has had the effect of stimulating interstate sympathy
strikes in order to gain Commonwealth, as distinct from state, jurisdiction. In
the third place, since there is no Commonwealth jurisdiction except in respect
of a dispute, there can only be Commonwealth action with respect to the parties
to a dispute. Hence there can be no common rule throughout industry as there
is in the state system.' A union must act federally and serve claims on every
employer in the industry. It has been held that rejection of a log of claims
by one employer in each state creates a dispute and brings the matter within
Commonwealth jurisdiction. But even then workers who joined the industry
after the settlement of the dispute are not parties to the award because they
were not parties to the dispute.
Acting under its constitutional powers the Commonwealth Parliament in
1904 set up the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court. Today
about half the Australian workers are covered by its awards which, in virtue
of the paramountry clause in the Constitution, take precedence over state awards
in the event of inconsistency, though not necessarily in the event of mere over-
lap. What constitutes inconsistency has proved a perplexing, almost metaphysical
problem.
Although the court must wait for a dispute to arise before taking social
justice action it has inevitably taken the initiative in the wage fixing process
by laying down conditions of work in an award settling a nationwide dispute;
and, since a dispute exists upon service and rejection of a log of claims, the
only problem about securing this initiative is a mechanical one. Some words
must at this point be addressed to the problem of characterization of the func-
tions of the Court. These fall into four categories: (1) conciliation; (2) award
making; (3) interpretation of awards; and (4) decision that an award has
been broken and resort to penal remedies.
In appearance all four acts belong to the judicial sphere of government,
but when one considers the similarity of functions with those of state wages
boards the legislative nature of arbitration becomes more obvious. Until
1956 the Commonwealth Court could both make an award and police it, and
to this extent was exercising legislative, executive and judicial functions in
combination. In 1918 the High Court of Australia characterized formations
as follows:
The judicial power is concerned with the ascertainment, declara-
tion and enforcement of the rights and liabilities of the parties
as they exist and are deemed to exist at the moment the proceedings
are instituted, whereas the function of the arbitral power in rela-
tion to industrial disputes is to ascertain and declare but not to
enforce what in the opinion of the arbitrator ought to be the respec-
tive rights and liabilities of the parties in relation to each other.4
Pursuing this characterization the High Court in 1956 held that the amal-
3 Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow & Co., 11 Commonwealth
L. Rep. 311 (1910).
4 Waterside Workers Federation v. Alexander, 25 Commonwealth L. Rep. 434 (1918).
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gamation of functions in the Arbitration Court offended the doctrine of consti-
tutional separation of powers, and held certain of the functions invalid.' This
decision was upheld by the Privy Council, which remains the ultimate appellate
tribunal. The Commonwealth Parliament was thus required to separate func-
tions and it has created two entities in place of the Court, a Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission which exercises the award-making or legislative func-
tion, and an Industrial Court which is invested with the judicial power over
awards once made. In addition the conciliation process may be exercised by
a number of conciliation commissioners before a dispute goes to arbitration.
Relationship of Arbitration and Collective Bargaining
Portus, one of the conciliation commissioners, has recently summarized the
salient features of both state and Commonwealth systems as follows:
1. They encourage the organization of employees and em-
ployers into trade unions and employers' organizations.
2. They encourage collective bargaining between these groups
representing employers and employees and they provide that the
terms of a collective agreement will be legally enforceable.
3. They aim to settle industrial disputes not by strikes and
industrial warfare but in default of agreement by an award bind-
ing on the parties to a dispute.
4. They make it possible for the terms of collective agreements
and awards to become a common rule binding on all employers
and employees in the industry concerned. 6
It is evident, then, that collective bargaining and arbitration are inter-
connected processes and not antithetical. Collective agreements are registerable
in the state industrial courts and acquire the force of awards. They are also
registerable with the Commonwealth Commission, but since the Commission
only has jurisdiction over disputes an agreement is registerable only when in
settlement of a dispute.7 A wage fixing agreement has been held not to be in
settlement of a dispute, and hence it is not registerable. However, it remains a
common law agreement, and since in Australia a trade union has corporate
status, it is more effective than the traditional collective agreement in England.
The High Court has indicated in obiter that there would be no difficulty in-
volved in suing on it.
There are, therefore, the following remedies available to enforce collective
bargains:
1. If unregistered, they are common law contracts, and, though specific
performance is unlikely to be granted, an award of damages is sufficient in-
ducement to performance.
2. If registered they render all unregistered agreements unenforceable.
3. If registered there is a right of action, with penalties for breach.
4. To an indeterminate extent, in the case both of registered and unregis-
tered agreements, mandamus and injunction are available.
5 Boilermakers Case, 1956 ARGUs L. Rzv. 163.
6 Portus, op. cit. supra note 1.
7 Federated Engine Drivers & Firemen's Assn. v. Broken Hill Proprietary, 16 Common-
wealth L. Rep. 715 (1913).
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5. Also to an indeterminate extent contempt of court may be ordered
for failure to act pursuant to a registered agreement.
The integration of the collective bargain in the arbitration system has al-
tered the status and emphasis of industrial agreement. It is no longer a matter
of private law but engages public interest in a publir document covered by
statute. It binds persons not members of the industry at the time of contracting,
though previous to registration objection may be lodged by interested parties.
This objection will be adjudicated upon and the industrial court will then
order registration or otherwise. An agreement is usually for a fixed time, and
may be varied by a subsequent arbitral award. The whole process of arbitra-
tion is, in fact, ancillary to agreement. For example, in the state systems more
or less emphasis is placed upon preliminary negotiation, and the industrial court
will have power to call a conference of the parties and only in the event of
failure to agree will it proceed to issue an award. Compulsion thus follows a
breakdown in contract and is not in substitution for it.
Wage Fixing and the Arbitral Process
The social justice emphasis has been paramount in the development of
the Australian system, and in the result the industrial courts have become in-
strumentalities of economic policy in the distribution of the national income.
The process began with the fixing of a minimum wage. One of the pioneer
undertakings of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court was to fix this minimum
on a nationwide basis in 1907.8 It fixed a basic wage based on "the normal
needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilized
society." This basic wage was fixed at 42 shillings, and it has been steadily
adjusted until today it is some six times that figure. Of course the adjustment
must await a dispute, but since a dispute can be generated merely by making
a claim the Commonwealth instrumentality easily gains jurisdiction to -order
increases by varying of awards.
The first step of fixing a minimum having been taken, the next followed
as matter of course. This was to fix differentials for added skills or difficulties
of work. These are known as margins. The possibility inherent in this system
of maintaining social stratification was not fully adverted to until 1954 when
the Court laid down that the margin for skills in the engineering trade should
be proportionate to what they were before the war. The same formula was
then applied to other industries, and tended to become uniform throughout
the country as the state wages boards and industrial courts adopted it.
Last year the engineering industry made a claim for increased basic wage
and increased margins. The marginal increase was raised 28 per cent and
margins all up the scale adjusted accordingly. Almost as a matter of course
state wages boards adjusted their awards on the same principle. The figure of
28 per cent rise was arrived at after long analysis of the country's economic
prospects and in the light of productivity figures. The increase tends to be in-
flationary but there is a link, largely implicit, between the arbitral determina-
tions and government banking policy which minimizes this effect, especially
8 Harvester Judgment, 2 Court Arbitration Reports 1.
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at a time of great increase in productivity and a general tendency towards com-
petitive price cutting. In theory the increase in productivity should yield in-
come and capital gains to shareholders and increased income to labour with
proportionate increase for skills. There are inevitable stresses and strains in
the system, but no tremendous alarm is evident.
To illustrate the effect of the margins policy on wages one may instance
the case of the university professor who before the war was in receipt of a
salary of 1,100 pounds, about four times the then basic wage. The present
basic wage, when adjusted on a pre-war basis, theoretically yields the professor
a margin for skill that should put his present income at 4,750 pounds to main-
tain the differential that existed between his salary and the basic wage in 1939.
Actually it is at present 3,500 pounds, the professional community always lagging
behind, for lack of machinery, the industrial community. Since the banking and
insurance groups are seeking to have their margins fixed on the same basis as
the industrial community, the whole professional group should be brought into
line within a year or so. With this time lag, then, the professor should theoreti-
cally maintain the relative standard of living which he enjoyed in 1939, just
as the fitter and turner does. Needless to say it does not work out quite like
this, owing to changing social practices. The fitter and turner, for example,
could not have afforded a refrigerator in 1939 whereas today this is taken for
granted. On the other hand, the professor will not have a maid servant today
and will live in a smaller house but he will spend more on travel, gadgets and
motorcars. Strictly speaking, too, the net margin is not what it was in 1939
owing to the higher tax incidence on higher salaries. The class gap thus tends
to narrow despite the maintenance of differentials.
Principal Effects of the Australian System
We can now sum up the main features of the Australian system.
1. It offers almost automatic machinery for equitable distribution of the
national wealth. How you view this depends, no doubt, on whether you gain
or lose in the process. Employers on the whole claim it is inflationary but the
actual capital expansion in industry (35 per cent increase in share values last
year alone) indicates that wage increases are not the only, or perhaps the fun-
damental, feature of inflation in Australia. Workers appear to like the system
because the skilled worker is now acquiring a middle class complex and is more
interested in margins over the basic wage than anything else. It is significant
that the militant unions are making applications more for margins than for
other conditions of labour. To this extent labour and capitalism are being
wedded and industrial quiet and efficiency seems to be the result.
2. Although there is no compulsory unionism the system is heavily weighted
in favour of it. An employer's privilege to switch labour and employ non-union
labour is restricted by many arbitral awards, which might prescribe employment
preference to unionists or limit the grounds for discharge, or require discharge
of employees who do not join unions. Freedom to form a rival union is limited
by the process of registration, the courts not very readily buying trouble with
existing unions by validating rival ones, especially when an award limits em-
ployment to members of a registered union.
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3. In addition to the usual law against strikes and lockouts, some arbitra-
tion acts provide that a refusal to work according to the award terms is punish-
able by fine. The wording of these enlarges considerably the definition of "strike."
Where the penal clauses prove ineffective there is an inherent power to punish
for contempt of court. Hence the imployer has an automatic recourse to gov-
ernmental machinery in the event of industrial strife and the union has the
expectation that by playing along with the system it will gain an increased
share in the national income.
